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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
by a written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open
court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court
having jurisdiction to try the offense. The legislature may enact laws,
not inconsistent herewith, governing the form, content, manner and
tine of presentation of the instrument effectuating such waiver.
In People v. Carroll,19 the defendant, brought to trial on an indictment
charging him with grand larceny in the second degree, waived jury trial. A written
stipulation signed by defendant and his counsel, citing the constitutional provision
and stating defendant's name, indictment number, the waiver, and a recital of
full knowledge was entered into. The district attorney objected to the waiver on
the ground that no legislative enactment had been made pursuant to the consti-
tutional provision. The case proceeded without a jury, however, over his objection.
To test the court's power to accept the waiver, the charge was re-presented
to the Grand Jury which handed down a second indictment upon the same facts
and for the same crime. Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded not guilty and
moved to dismiss the second indictment on the grounds of former jeopardy.
The motion was granted and was subsequently unanimously affirmed by the
Appellate Division from which decision appeal was taken.
The Court of Appeals, speaking of the rule of construction to be applied
to constitutional provisions, stated: "When this language is dear and leads to no
absurd conclusion there is no occasion, and indeed, it would be improper to
search beyond the instrument for an assumed intent."20 Since the form of the
waiver was indicated for criminal cases and the grant of authority to the legislature
phrased permissively, the section logically would seem self-executing. Further, in
construing constitutional provisions as between being self-executing or merely
general directions for subsequent legislation the rule is now in favor of self-
executing provisions.21 Reviewing the history of the amendment the Court
found substantial evidence that the amendment was intended to be self-executing.
Accordingly, the Court found the procedural detail sufficient without supplemental
legislation and thus affirmed the lower courts.
Form of Remedy from Illegal Sentence; Use of Indeferminate Term
Habeas corpus is ordinarily an appropriate remedy, with respect to the
judgment or sentence where and only where the court was without jurisdiction in
19. 3 N.Y.2d 686, 171 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1958).
20. Citing: Latting v. Cordell, 197 Old. 369, 172 P.2d, 397 (1946); State
ex rel. Trent v. Sims, 138 W.Va. 244, 77 S.E.2d 122 (1953); MeKinney, CONST.
RULES OF INTERPRETATION, part 1, p. 5.
21. State ex rel Russell v. Bliss, 156 Ohio St. 147, 101 N.E.2d 289 (1951);
Morgan v. Board of Supervisors, 67 Ariz. 133, 192 P.2d 236 (1948); State ex rel
Noe v. Knop, La.App., 190 So. 135 (1939).
COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
rendering the judgment or exceeded its power in passing sentence.22 The applica-
tion of this concept was at issue in People v. Silberglitt.
23
The legislature in order to give offenders convicted of certain crimes a better
opportunity for rehabilitation, enacted section 203 of the Correction Law which
provides for commitment in a reformatory rather than a penal institution. This
section provides for what is known as an indeterminate sentence which is often
longer in duration (maximum of three years) than the appropriate sentence
under the Penal Law. Subsection (e) (3) of section 203 provides: "This article
shall not apply to any person who is: ... mentally or physically incapable of being
substantially benefited by being committed to a correctional and reformatory
institution" (emphasis added).
The Court in the instant case recognized that the indeterminate sentence is
often used as an additional penalty rather than a rehabilitation measure. In the
Silberglitt case, the defendant, berated in most certain terms, could, on the basis of
the judge's remarks, be characterized as incorrigible. Nonetheless, he was sentenced
to an indeterminate term. After one year a habeas corpus action was brought
which led to this appeal 24
The Supreme Court 25 dismissed the writ holding that the sentence itself
indicates an implicit finding that the defendant was capable of substantial benefit.
The Appellate Division26 affirmed the holding of the Supreme Court and further
found that since there was no issue as to jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the person, habeas corupus was not the proper remedy2 7
The Court of Appeals held that habeas corpus will not lie since the court had
jurisdiction of the person, jurisdiction of the crime charged, and the power to
impose the sentence which was meted out. The issue is said to be that of power to
sentence, but it is not discussed how this power can be retained after an express
finding that the prerequisite facts outlined in the statute were not present. The
Court of Appeals and the Appellate Division cite cases to the effect that habeas
corpus is not appropriate to raise objections based upon facts such as defendant
being defrauded into pleading guilty, being convicted by perjured evidence, or
being convicted due to suppression of evidence.28 The Court seems purposely to
22. People v. Martin, 286 N.Y. 27, 35 N.E.2d 636 (1941), reversing 261
App.Div. 865, 24 N.Y.S.2d 729 (3d Dep't 1941).
23. 4 N.Y.2d 59, 172 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1958).
24. For discussion of why one year delay was necessary, see People v.
Silberglitt, 5 Misc.2d 502, 159 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup.Ct. 1956).
25. 5 Misc.2d 133, 159 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup.Ct. 1957).
26. 3 A.D.2d 966, 163 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Ist Dep't 1957).
27. Morhous v. New York Supreme Court, 293 N.Y. 131, 56 N.E.2d 79
(1944).
28. Hogan v. New York Supreme Court, 295 N.Y. 92, 65 N.E.2d 181 (1946);
see note 27 supra.
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avoid discussion of the basis for the retention of power to sentence which it states
to be the key to the problem; cases cited do not illuminate its opinion.
The Court by its language avoids the Supreme Court holding. It is mentioned
in passing that defendant's counsel argued the invalidity of sentence. Since con-
troverted issues of fact can not be properly raised by habeas corpus,2 1 this could
be grounds for the majority position. However, the opinion does not seem to
make this clear.
Recognizing that the defendant has a remedy by appeal, the majority seems
to be avoiding a close examination of the question of jurisdiction. Judge Eder, in
People ex rel. Travatello v. Ashworth,ao compellingly argued a practically identical
case on the issue of jurisdiction and concluded the judge had lost his power to
sentence under section 203 by finding the defendant incapable of substantial
benefit. The Appellate Division reversed with no opinion, leaving the void
unfilled. Now, the majority in this case has filled the void, but has left the basis
of decision unclear.
The dissent concerns itself primarily with the Supreme Court's position that
the sentence creates an irrebutable presumption the court has correctly determined
the defendant's character under the statute. Reviewing cases in this area, the
dissent concludes that there has always been absent an explicit finding as to the
defendant's character such as is present in this case." It argues that once the court
has taken upon itself to publicly determine the character of the defendant, it is
bound by the determination in pronouncing sentence. If it pronounces a sentence
inconsistent with its own findings, its sentence is void since the legislative grant of
power under the statute is no longer present. While the dissent argues its primary
point well, it does not go into the ramifications of holding a judge to his pre-
sentence proclamations as to defendant's character. Berating is quite common in
many courts; if these tirades are seriously construed it might adversely affect the
very purpose of the statute at hand. The strong word is not always appropriately
followed by the harsh sentence.
If penal reform were as advanced as the well-intending legislature's statute,
this problem would not be so acute. Since it is not, the indeterminate sentence
is today an effective means of "stiffening sentence."
29. See note 27 supra; also People v. Lambert, 237 App.Div. 39, 260 N.Y.
Supp. 678 (1932); af 'd, 26 N.Y. 511, 188 N.E. 42 (1933).
30. 182 Misc. 52, 43 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup.Ct. 1943); rev'd 268 App.Div. 892, 51
N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dep't 1944).
31. People v. Thompson, 251 N.Y. 428, 167 N.E. 575 (1929).
